Operations, foundational DOD doctrine establishing cyberspace as a warfighting domain. With so much effort and national treasure being applied to cyberspace issues, it is crucial that past network centric warfare concept be applied in today's cyberspace environment. This paper examines the relevance of net centric warfare in the age of cyberspace operations and seeks to determine if combining the tenets of net centric warfare with emerging cyberspace operations doctrine could deliver improved operational capabilities.
NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
During the Industrial Age, power came from mass. Now power tends to come from information, access, and speed.
-Vice Admiral (Ret. This paper examines the relevance of net centric warfare in the age of cyberspace operations and seeks to determine if combining the tenets of net centric warfare with emerging cyberspace operations doctrine could deliver improved operational capabilities. As a part of the analysis, war theory and principles will be considered in relation to NCW and cyberspace operations. This is done in order to establish the link between NCW, cyberspace operations, and warfighting principles.
Furthermore, it helps to frame this analysis in terms of military application. In order to limit the scope of this analysis, net-centric and cyberspace effects outside the current scope of military operations will not be assessed. This focus is in no way intended to dismiss the tremendous strategic effects NCW and cyberspace operations have outside of the military domain. Indeed, it is entirely plausible that attacks against a nation state's economy, social interactions, communications, power infrastructures, commerce, or belief systems could win a war without so much as the firing of a single shot.
So why does this matter? The DOD is implementing cyberspace operations with a great sense of urgency. This is a necessary reaction to successful attacks and exploitation of the U.S. global information grid and specifically DOD networks.
According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates the United States is "under cyberattack virtually all the time, every day" and the DOD plans to more than quadruple the number of cyberspace experts it employs to ward off such attacks. 1 There is growing evidence that the U.S. has to a large extent abandoned its pursuit of NCW. According to Dr.
Sean Lawson an Associate Professor in the Department of Communications at the
University of Utah,
The NCW that sought to achieve the very rational and modest goal of adopting the same kinds of technologies and organizational structures that seemed to have revolutionized the rest of society, all for the purpose of promoting a military flexible and adaptable enough to meet the challenges of an uncertain world, have been abandoned in favor of an incoherent, internally inconsistent, and in some ways even more technophilic and overconfident vision of future warfare.
On the other hand Dr. Jeffrey Groh Professor of Information and Technology at the U.S.
Army War College says that -the term NCW is going to die a slow death but the concept isn't going away.‖ 3 Recent examination of the cyberspace environment suggests that -the more cyberspace is critical to a nation's economy and defense, the more attractive to enemies is the prospect of crippling either or both via attacks on or through it.‖ 4 Recognizing the tremendous growth and potential opportunities offered by globally interconnected networks the founding fathers of NCW offered a comprehensive theory for conducting warfare with the assistance of modern networking technology.
NCW Background
The beginnings of NCW can be traced back to the publishing of Joint Vision NCW is about human and organizational behavior. NCW is based on adopting a new way of thinking-network-centric thinking-and applying it to military operations. NCW focuses on the combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or networking of the warfighting enterprise. It is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared battlespace awareness that can be exploited via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to achieve commanders' intent. Information superiority also requires open access to information and the availability of information resources across the global information grid. Finally to attain superiority, a force must decrease its own need for information especially in terms of volume, and focus on the sensors and data that are most applicable to the fight at hand. 10 Next, a net-centric force must have access to information via shared awareness.
This requires the building of collaborative networks to share information regardless of location. Moreover the network must be secured in such a way that the system and information residing thereon can be defended against exploitation or attack. 11 The downside of collaborative information sharing is incorrect information can be propagated across the network and then acted upon leading to disastrous results. For this reason it is critical that information by verified and authenticated by multiple sources prior to acceptance. This validation process can lead to delays in information availability; however in a highly networked environment multiple source authentications should be relatively prompt compared to other non-networked alternatives.
In addition to shared awareness, speed of command and decision making permits recognition of an information advantage and its subsequent conversion into a competitive battlefield enhancement. The principle of speed of command is familiar to all students of Colonel John Boyd, father of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA)
loop. Colonel Boyd posits that the combatant that can observe, orient, decide, and act the fastest wins the battle. 12 In order to achieve speed of command and decision making, innovation and adaptation must reduce decision timelines converting information advantage into decision superiority and decisive effects on the battlefield.
Additionally, speed of command necessitates the ability to lock out an adversary's choices in order to achieve option dominance. 13 Self-synchronization, a key tenet of NCW, enables low-level forces to gain shared awareness of the commander's intent and operate autonomously, even to the point of retasking themselves based on how the operational situation is unfolding. 14 This principal is made possible by facilitating subordinate force initiatives in response to the battlefield tempo, increasing force understanding of the commander's intent even as it changes or evolves, and enabling subordinate unit adaptation and responses to battlespace developments as they occur in real time. 15 The next principle, dispersed forces, seeks to move combat operations out of a linear context and focus them instead where they are needed at a decisive time and place. In order to disperse forces, net centricity couples operations, intelligence, communications, and logistics functions to achieve precise effects while at the same time gaining speed and increasing tempo as compared to the adversary. 16 Going hand in glove with dispersed forces, -demassification‖ focuses on massing of the desired effect rather than massing of force at a geographical position on the map.
Of all principals of war, the principal of mass is most jeopardized in a distributed, network-oriented environment. According to Joint Publication 3-0, -The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.‖ 17 Clausewitz declared -there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated.‖ 18 Demassification however specifically seeks to avoid the massing of friendly forces until absolutely necessary and upon conclusion of the massing event is often followed by another demassification of combat power. Demassification also recognizes that given technology associated with remotely piloted vehicles, global reach capabilities, and instantaneous air-to-ground engagements, force massing may be undesirable and indeed counterproductive. This principle has been used to great effect against the United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan, and by non-state actors launching attacks using small groups or even individuals to spectacular effect. 19 The expansion of forward deployed networked sensors is referred to as deep sensor reach. This principle leverages the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, satellite systems, blue force tracker, and individual operators on the battlefield. To be employed most effectively the sensor data must be fused and acted upon quickly. This is clearly the perfect job for a networked intelligent system. 20 Like the OODA loop, the principle of altering initial conditions at higher rates of change than the enemy seeks to befuddle an adversary by adjusting faster than they can respond. For the purposes of NCW, operating swiftly and adapting rapidly to unfolding operations can have a profound negative psychological impact on an adversary even to the point of confusion where they would be unable to react or if they chose to do so would almost surely choose incorrectly, further deteriorating their situation.
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The final principle, compressed operations and levels of war, is attained by eliminating bureaucratic procedures between Services and forces and pushing down operations to the lowest level at which they can be conducted to achieve decisive and rapid effects. The intent of this principle is to attain the fastest speed across the spectrum of operations, enhance cooperation between low-level units, and eliminate artificial boundaries allowing the lowest possible organizational levels to work together to accomplish the mission. 22 Understanding the governing principles of NCW is important to the overarching concept that seeks to enhance or revolutionize military operations across all warfighting domains. At its highest level, NCW hypothesizes: robustly networked forces improve information sharing; information sharing enhances information quality and situational awareness; shared situational awareness improves collaboration, self-synchronization and speed; and finally, that these taken together increase mission effectiveness. 23 At its core, NCW is about enabling the fight in a given battlespace-this is a theory focused on warfighting.
Cyberspace Operations Background
Whereas NCW is directly focused on war fighting effects and improving causing a submission to the adversaries will by attacking its economic, military, or political power, it shall be considered within the realm of warfare. 28 An additional consideration would have to be the seriousness of the cyberspace attack. On the low end of the spectrum, probes and exploitation would rarely necessitate war but on the other end of the spectrum creating casualties, affecting military operations, or interfering with intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems would undoubtedly require a firm response. 29 Having defined the boundaries and intent of this analysis of cyberspace operations, the first area of examination is computer network attack.
Computer network attack, also referred to as cyberattack, is defined as the deliberate disruption or corruption by one state of a system of interest to another state.
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It's the only artificial manmade warfighting domain, is primarily run and operated by commercial business interests, is largely considered a non-kinetic environment, and is accessible worldwide at low cost and with effects that can be far reaching up to and including the strategic level. 31 Clausewitz held strongly that the defense was superior to the offense at the tactical and strategic levels of war. 32 Cyberspace defense or computer network defense is focused on the protection of computer based systems and information networks and is often referred to as information assurance. Defending computer networks is a cyberspace practitioner's most difficult task. In terms of warfare it is akin to building defensive barriers to prevent an adversary from penetrating vast expanses of sovereign territory. Perhaps a useful analogy would be France's Maginot Line of fortifications that were built following World War I to prevent or slow a German offensive. Much as these barriers were overrun in World War II; the defense of a network can be easily circumvented at its weakest point.
Taking this example a step farther, imagine that France had global interests and extended the fortifications to cover the globe with thousands and perhaps millions of required entry points for the purposes of its own interests. While an overly simplified illustration, it provides some sense of the difficulty of defending such a massive frontier.
Network defenders tasked to provide information assurance view the global information grid as a series of linked defenses. The weakest link in the defense causes it to fail and an unfounded belief that the overarching system is secure provides a false sense of security that is easily exploited. By its very nature the development of redundancies or multiple entry points to ease network access simplifies the task of determined hackers.
As the beneficiary of the Internet's great promise, the United States has invested heavily in economic, commercial, and governmental access to networked resources.
The problem is that cyberspace like the maritime and space domains is an unconquered realm shared by the world and no one can claim or fully control it. The Internet was environment. 42 Furthermore NCW tends to look at the operating environment in terms of how it directly correlates to warfighting within a prescribed battlespace whereas cyberspace includes the whole global information grid, including the Internet in its entirety. Arguments over scope aside, there is no dispute regarding the operating environment where both NCW and cyber operations reside.
The final major similarity between the two concepts is that they are both incredibly complex and have stringent training requirements. The complexity of the environment means that managing vast stores of information, maintaining network availability, and protecting the network from intrusions are difficult to assure. During warfighting operations there is little tolerance for mistakes or failures when lives are at risk, and in the cyber environment maintenance downtime, outages, and disruptions are inevitable. These disturbances can largely be managed by providing redundancies across the network however; this increases the complexity of network administration. In order to minimize outages and maximize the tenets of cyber operations and net centricity, network operators must be highly trained and experienced. The very skills
that these cyber operators demonstrate make it very difficult to retain them since they are so highly valued in commercial industry as well. NCW can also complicate the actions of lower-level operators since they now have an additional requirement to provide information upon which decision makers must rely to make operational decisions. The complexity of the environment can also complicate already disjointed coalition operations. During Operation Enduring Freedom the U.S. was required to purchase communications equipment to bolster NATO interoperability, and with the newest NATO nation's technology training was also a tremendous hurdle. 43 Complexity and rigorous training requirements in the coalition environment serve to ratchet up interoperability complications to near intolerable levels.
Differences between NCW and Cyberspace Operations
The key differences between cyberspace operations and NCW are their levels of support, the operators, the level of effects, and the adversaries' success in the 
Recommendations
As has been discussed while analyzing the backgrounds of NCW and cyberspace operations, there are many similarities and differences between the two concepts however the key to future success in cyberspace can best be achieved by blending the two concepts in the cyberspace operating environment. By uniting the two concepts combined effects are gained and amplified to better address the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Where NCW is better applied at the tactical level, the two concepts converge at the operational level, and at the strategic level of war, cyberspace operations more fully address desired effects than NCW which can yield strategic effects but is not designed to do so with any regularity. And where NCW is more gainfully employed by operators in the active theater of operations, cyberspace operations provide a global, secure, reliable, and trustworthy operating environment upon which NCW must necessarily rely. The advantage of combining NCW and cyberspace operations is that the strengths, weaknesses, similarities, and differences tend to overlap and complement each other filling gaps and seams in the concepts.
NCW and cyberspace operations were conceived to achieve different results.
NCW was designed to enable the warfighter on the battlefield and empower forces from the lowest to the highest level in a theater of operations. NCW was designed to help warriors fight better, faster, and smarter at the same time understating the situation on the field in previously unimagined. Cyberspace operations were developed to service a different need altogether. Cyberspace operations never promised to improve the OODA loop, they never promised to improve situational awareness on the ground, and they never ever sought to change or empower human and organizational behaviors. Instead cyberspace operations focused on sustaining and protecting the U.S. operating environment, enabling attacks to shape and soften the enemy's core networked infrastructures, and prudently exploiting information that strengthens knowledge while weakening an opponent's understanding. To maximize the potential of NCW and cyberspace operations the two concepts should be fused into one all-encompassing model (figure 2). showing the relationships between NCW and cyberspace operations depicts the interaction of cyber-attack, defense, and exploitation with information superiority. In the focused NCW environment, cyber defense, attack, and exploitation are key contributors to the NCW fight for information superiority. On the other hand, the NCW concept of shared awareness needs to be developed across cyberspace operations. Currently cyber defense and anti-exploitation efforts suffer greatly from a lack of shared awareness across the global information grid. In the NCW environment every fighter is a sensor-the same approach is needed across the cyber enterprise. National and international government agencies, law enforcement organizations, and commercial establishments need to act as sensors across the cyber realm so that defenses can be improved, attacks can be sensed and deterred, and exploitation efforts can be frustrated. This will require a multipronged approach that produces support at the highest levels of the federal government, delivers a comprehensive cyber strategy, amalgamates existing doctrine, and trains professional military operators at all levels from the core to the edge. Several other synergistic effects are logically laid out such as demassification of cyber forces to defend the network until such time as an attack is identified and can then be defended by a focused effort at the decisive point of attack.
Conclusion
NCW was an innovative and empowering concept that was arguably ahead of its time. Its principles and concepts improve and complement cyberspace operations by filling gaps, delivering immediate effects on the battlefield, and empowering battlespace awareness while at the same time benefitting from cyberspace operations ability to cripple the enemy's operations through cyberattacks, sustain our own cyber environment through cyber defense, and know what your adversary knows through cyber exploitation. The concepts of NCW and cyberspace operations concepts belong together and yes, NCW has earned its place in the age of cyberspace operations and the warfighter deserves the benefits afforded by fusing these concepts now.
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